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Abstract 
The article addresses the relevance of Charles Taylor’s analysis in his influential magnum opus A 
Secular Age (2007) to those parts of the world which are not included in the North-Atlantic world 
on which he concentrates.  It does so by discussing issues arising from case studies of Asian, 
African and Middle Eastern contexts where the impact of different types of secularity varies in 
terms of its incidence, intensity and scope, sometimes paralleling, often contrasting those 
developments Taylor found to be key in the emergence of a secular age in the West.  By contrast 
with Taylor’s analysis, a common feature of these studies is the stress placed upon the role of 
political actors in promoting or contesting the secularity of the public sphere.  It is argued that a 
useful approach to making sense of the great variety of patterns identified can be found by 
combining insights from Niklas Luhmann and Pierre Bourdieu in order to construct a matrix 
illustrating the types and levels of differentiation and contestation in and around the religious field.   
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Based on an international research cluster of country specialists interested in the nexus between 
politics and religion in countries of Asia, Africa and the Middle East, we have edited, together with 
Shylashri Shankar, a volume that compares the place of religion and the secular in countries outside 
the West.1  All contributors took as their starting point Charles Taylor’s “A Secular Age” (2007), in 
which the author argues that the widespread availability of an option of not believing first evolved 
in the North Atlantic world. He examines the processes by which this option emerged, mostly by 
focusing his inquiry 2  on developments in philosophy and religion (specifically, Western 
Christianity), while social, economic, and political developments for a large part remain back stage. 
In the following, we summarize some of the lessons our contributors have drawn from their case 
studies, sometimes paralleling, often contrasting those developments Taylor found to be key in the 
emergence of a secular age in the West. We close with a sociological framework through which 
contestations around religion and state can be systematically schematized and compared. 
  
A Secular Age 
The case studies of our volume focus on the patterns of religion-state relations in the modern 
era, which each in their own ways, have created particular secularities, but often not in the sense 
Taylor finds most important. Taylor identifies three notions of Secularity, of which he is most 
interested in the third. The first notion is that of the classic differentiation theory3: Secularity I 
emerges as religion is evacuated from public life and its related areas, in particular political 
authority, law, science, the bureaucracy, and the economy. Secularity II is the notion describing the 
decline of religious belief and practice, something sociologists argued was the case in the Europe of 
the 1960s and which they predicted would be a universal trend.  Today, European Secularity II, if 
religion as such really has been on the decline there at all, is regarded as the global exception rather 
than the rule.4 But it is a third notion that particularly interests Taylor. Under Secularity III he 
understands a condition in which it is possible to not believe, and still aspire to live a fulfilled life. 
Crucially, in this third state the nature of social and legal conditions allows for the choice not to 
believe: a secular age is one in which societies accept non-belief as much as belief and do not 
proceed from the assumption that only a believer can lead a fulfilled life. This shift is reached by “a 
series of new departures,” in which earlier forms of religious life are dissolved and new ones 
created. It is evident in the way the location of meaning is perceived: in the pre-modern world, 
structures and traditions of meaning already existed around us, but in the modern world, meaning is 
endogenous. What was once a human’s “porous self” (going against God was not an option because 
life was lived in a social world peopled by spirits and fellow human beings) has been replaced by a 
“buffered self”: a self aware of the possibility of disengagement. Further departures include the 
sense of time, which has changed radically from one including the higher time of eternity to time 
seen as structured and quotidian, and the notion of the place of man from living in an enveloping 
cosmos to being merely situated in the universe, taking one from a fear of the dead to a fear of death 
itself. This condition of Secularity III, according to Taylor, developed uniquely in the North 
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Atlantic world, where it prevails today, and he leaves open the question whether it could be, or has 
in the meantime been, realized in other parts of the world.5 
 This is where our volume takes its starting point. The contributors examine, each in their 
geographic area of expertise, whether, to what extent and how, a secular age in Taylor’s sense may 
have eventuated, and if /where it has not, what other forms of secularity might be detected. 
 
The cases  
The volume stretches across a large geographical range beyond Taylor’s North Atlantic 
world, encompassing case studies of modern China, Japan, Russia, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Iran, 
Egypt, Turkey, Morocco and Israel. In an attempt to transcend a simple dichotomy of West and 
non-West, which often boils down to elaborations on Christian-Muslim or West-East contrasts, we 
selected case that ensure diversity in three principal respects.  
Firstly, the chapters discuss societies where monotheistic, polytheistic, and nontheistic belief 
systems varyingly predominate. In addition, rather than featuring only one or two Muslim cases, on 
the basis of which broad conclusions about the “Muslim world” are then formulated, the collection 
includes a diversity of several case studies from the Muslim world, both Arab and non-Arab, from 
the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and North Africa, and with considerable intra-Islamic 
diversity where variously Sunni, Shi‘a and Sufi currents dominate. The volume also contains a 
chapter on Israel, which as the only predominantly Jewish country rarely receives attention in 
comparative studies of secularity. Furthermore, the collection includes a case of that significant part 
of Christianity which Taylor omits, i.e. Eastern/Orthodox Christianity, and as such, the country that 
has most influenced the development of religion in the 20th century Orthodox Christian world, 
Russia. Finally, with discussions of societies whose majorities are Confucian (China), Buddhist-
Shinto (Japan), and Hindu (India), the volume includes predominantly polytheist and nontheist 
cases.  
Secondly, the countries differ in their arrangements for the relationship between religion and 
law; Israel, India and the Muslim states place a strong emphasis on religious law in some or all 
domains, while in China, Japan and Russia, questions about the jurisdiction of religious law play 
little part in the secularization debates. 
Thirdly, the country cases vary in terms of public participation and the open contestation of 
power: while some governments, such as in China and Iran, are authoritarian and largely shielded 
from public pressure and accountability, others are long-standing democracies, such as Japan and 
India, where questions of religious freedom and religious identity may determine electoral 
outcomes.  
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religious makeup of the population, the status of religious law, and the nature of the political 
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A Secular Age outside the West 
A first major conclusion arising from the comparative analysis is that contestations around 
Taylor’s Secularity I (the evacuation of religion from public life) occupy a much more prominent 
place than was the case in Taylor’s narrative of the Christian West. Such contestations around 
Secularity I are particularly apparent in the Muslim world and Israel, as both Islam and Judaism 
may be interpreted as placing more demands on public law than is the case in Christianity, 
Buddhism or Hinduism. We refer to this as relating to the “burdening” of religion by state policies: 
with the expansion of the regulation of private and public space by the consolidating modern state, 
religions are differentially impacted, depending on how much of this regulation would historically 
have been undertaken on the basis of religious interpretation. In all Muslim countries included in 
this volume, as well as among Jewish communities, the administration of both personal law and 
education was undertaken by religious elites prior to the emergence of the modern state. With the 
advent of the latter, the transplantation of Western legal systems and often the introduction of 
Western-style constitutions, these competencies were stripped from religious authorities. By 
contrast, by the time modern political and legal institutions had been introduced in the societies of 
Latin Christendom, independent religious elites had ceased to hold the monopoly of education and 
law. In what became referred to as Hinduism, such a monopoly had never existed, any more than it 
did in Buddhism. Therefore, the degree of burdening differs markedly across different geographic 
and civilizational contexts, depending on the realms regulated by religion prior to the emergence of 
the modern state. Accordingly, in Islam it is religious law that experiences profound interference by 
the 20th century state, while in China’s Confucian traditions, it is education. The importance of 
capturing this variation (how expansive is the contact surface of religion that can be impacted by 
state policies?) in an account of Secularity I becomes apparent especially, and possibly only, when 
comparing such encounters across various monotheistic and polytheist, as well as non-theistic 
traditions. 
 It is a remarkable fact that the word ‘secularism,’ as a political project so intricately bound 
up with Secularity I, scarcely occurs in the 776 main pages of text or in the 71 pages of notes of A 
Secular Age.  This is especially worthy of note given the fact that Taylor has also published 
influential essays both before and after on ‘Modes of Secularism’,6 ‘The Meaning of Secularism,’7 
and ‘Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism.’ 8  In ‘Western Secularity’, 9  which 
reprises the argument of A Secular Age, Taylor uses both terms, secularity and secularism, freely if 
not interchangeably. For all that it concentrates on the relatively recent emergence of Secularity III 
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in the North Atlantic world, A Secular Age does contain a number of important claims about major 
changes in Secularity I over the last half millennium in the West, as the passing references to the 
Protestant and Catholic Reformations, the 30 Years War, and the English, American, French and 
Russian revolutions illustrate.10  Taylor’s focus is, however, more on explicating and teasing out the 
implications of the work of important writers such as Hobbes, Grotius, Locke, Rousseau, Burke and 
Marx – concentrating attention either on the sense they made of the great historical conjunctures 
through which they lived or on their contributions to the development of thought about religion, the 
state and secularity.  Despite the incidental reference to these critical historical junctures his 
discussion was focused much less on the institutional-political changes, which occurred on the back 
of those events and their role in advancing the onset of the present ‘secular age.’11  
 Relatedly, the case studies of our volume by and large confirm Nikkie Keddie’s observation 
that secularization in “the non-Christian and non-Western worlds [which] are generally omitted 
from the debate [on secularization] [has] been more influenced by government action than by 
autonomous societal changes”.12 In examining conditions and developments in the societies under 
review, our contributors have been unable to sidestep the conflicts surrounding the place of religion 
in public life and the more or less provisional settlements which have eventuated. For Keddie this 
priority of the political, as we might call it, deserves recognition because “the very strengthening of 
a state demanded by modern economies requires considerable state control of public education, civil 
law, welfare and other spheres that is more secular than anything that existed in the past”.13  
 Second, Taylor’s decision to sidestep the debates around rival conceptions of religion, while 
understandable and defensible in the context of the exclusively Western focus of A Secular Age, 
cannot be finessed in the same way when it comes to identifying and explaining the incidence of 
secularity in non-Western contexts.  One ostensible reason why questions of definition could be set 
aside in the Western context is that the very category ‘religion’ can be seen, as scholars from 
Cantwell Smith to Talal Asad have long argued, as a distinctively Western concept.  Despite the 
fact that – or perhaps because – the concept was heavily informed by Western perceptions of 
colonial subjects, it is one which cannot readily be used outside the contexts of Latin Christendom 
without careful qualification. Gregory Starrett identifies among the first Western students of 
comparative religion in the nineteenth century the setting of a distinctive ‘Protestant tendency to see 
religion primarily as a system of beliefs, doctrines, and dogmas.’14 Alternative conceptions which 
privilege traditional practices and traditions as key defining features of religion implicitly challenge 
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such restrictively Latin Christian notions of secularity just as much as of religion itself.15 They also 
challenge Taylor’s key notions of different forms of secularity, which are necessarily parasitic on an 
understanding of religion as defined in Western Christianity.16  In several cases, the engagement 
with the Western Christian concept of religion has, in the twentieth century if not before, been 
necessitated by legal requirements to translate into local languages and legal practice various 
international obligations, for example, the commitments to respect the terms of the UN Declaration 
of Human Rights guaranteeing religious freedom. As if to confirm the observation, Casanova makes 
the linguistic point that ‘one of the most important global trends is the globalization of the category 
of ‘religion’ itself and the binary classification of ‘religious/secular,’ that it entails’.17 But as he also 
goes on to point out, ‘when people around the world use the same category of religion, they actually 
mean very different things. The actual concrete meaning of whatever people denominate as 
‘religious’ can only be elucidated in the context of their particular discursive practices.’18  The 
chapters on China and on Japan provide insight in how the actual business of translation of key 
terms into the appropriate vernaculars has presented particular problems. In both countries, a local 
term for the concept of ‘religion’ only entered the vernacular when trade, peace and concession 
treaties with Western powers necessitated it. The problem has hardly been less severe in India, 
despite the status of English as a ‘subsidiary official language’. T.N. Madan quotes an eloquent 
observation from a nineteenth century Indian intellectual: ‘You can translate a word by a word, but 
behind the word is an idea, the thing the word denotes, and this idea you cannot translate, if it does 
not exist among the people in whose language you are translating’.19  
 Third, the hermeneutic narrative of A Secular Age identifies certain features which are 
claimed to be, on the one hand, instinct to Western Christianity, and, on the other, not to be shared 
by other major world religions, for example: a perennial ‘drive to reform’, a lack of tolerance for 
what Taylor calls ‘complementarity’, and a deep antipathy to all forms of traditional magic.20 For 
Taylor, all three of these have over the centuries undermined the cultural viability of 
transcendentalist intimations, beliefs, and practices, and promoted the efflorescence of modern 
immanentist forms of secularity in their place.21 His implied view of the non-West’s ‘otherness’ can 
be read off from his insistence on Western exceptionalism by virtue of which world regions beyond 
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the West necessarily appear as if in a sort of photographic negative of the West.  As the chapters in 
our volume graphically illustrate, however, the relative absence of ‘Western features’ is hardly the 
most salient characteristic that emerges from a general comparative survey. Indeed, the actual 
presence of features originating in the West on the back of ‘imperial encounters’ forms an important 
part of all the case studies. The modalities of the Western impact have been shown to vary 
considerably from direct imposition by a series of imperial masters (India, Pakistan, Indonesia, 
Egypt, Palestine/Israel) to secularist transformation projects adopted by indigenous elites in 
imitation of Western models (Turkey, Iran, even the USSR, and late Qing and Republican China).  
In addition, the pressures to adhere to Western-led models of religious freedom (for example, in 
post-WWII Japan) or to incorporate Western legal codes and administrative systems (in the case of 
Morocco), have also clearly been shown to affect, if not determine, patterns of secularization.22 
In this, our volume confirms John Bowen’s argument that studies of secularization as a 
long-term process ‘can stretch to encompass much of the rest of the world, but only by tracing a 
genealogy from the West to the Rest, through processes of colonial or neo-colonial domination, or 
alternatively processes of movement and borrowing’.23 José Casanova concurs: ‘It just happened 
that the particular, Christian, Western European dynamic of secularization became globalized with 
the expansion of European colonialism, and with the ensuing global expansion of capitalism, of the 
European system of states, of modern science, and of modern ideologies of secularism’.24 While a 
large part of the story of secularity outside the North Atlantic world must take account of this tale of 
the import-export of Western secularity, however, the more interesting story is often to be found in 
how such models of religion-state relations have been re-shaped and re-defined in local contexts. 
A fourth important insight that emerges is that the state should not be seen as necessarily or 
inherently secular (contra Olivier Roy, for example). Instead, the state – in the West as well as 
beyond it – appears as typically both an actor and a stake in the various struggles around the role of 
religion in public life, even to the point of conjuring a degree of its own sacralization in the 
resulting outcomes. It can be argued that to make the otherwise common assumption that the state is 
by definition secular – and so itself immune to secularization and/or sacralization – involves a 
category error: states should instead be regarded as more or less secular, and more or less religious, 
whether along a single dimension or on a number of cross-cutting dimensions.25 
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 In focusing on key episodes over the last 150 years during which the mutual articulation of 
the religious and the secular was contested between rival forces and stakeholders, the case studies 
have thrown light on what can be seen as local instances of a perennial and ostensibly universal 
problem.  In Bowen’s terms, this is the essentially political problem of ‘how states manage to 
encompass or govern religions while not denying their truth claims or social rights,’ a problem 
which is seemingly found whenever and wherever ‘rulers seek to create a space of governance 
above that wielded by religious authorities.’26  With his focus on the conceptual genealogy of 
secularity describing ‘a set of historical processes that characterize the modern age (at least for 
some of the world)’, Taylor’s own analysis downplays this ‘dilemma of government.’27 In contrast 
to Taylor’s account, the different patterns of successive provisional settlements of this perennial 
political problem at the interface of religion and secular power has formed the key focus of our case 
studies.  
 
 
 
 
Patterns of Conflict in and around the Religious Field 
 
All of the case studies in the volume give weight to the argument prevalent among political 
sociologists that secularity is a result of social conflicts. As such conflicts are universal and not 
inherently/structurally different among world religions, we agree with Casanova (2006:19) that the 
concepts of secularization and secularity make sense “as an analytical framework for a comparative 
research agenda that aims to examine the historical transformations of all world religions under 
conditions of modern structural differentiation.” 
 In the volume Philip Gorski proposes to supplement Taylor’s approach to the aetiology of 
Western secularity by borrowing from the conceptual toolboxes of Niklas Luhmann and Pierre 
Bourdieu.28 This way, Gorski suggests, conflicts over the place of religion in public life can be 
usefully schematized. The sociologist Niklas Luhmann developed and applied his social systems 
theory to a number of macro-sociological processes. Many of his later writings have only 
posthumously been published, and are just now being translated into foreign languages, including 
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English, among them his “Die Religion der Gesellschaft” (‘The Religion of Society’). In his neo-
functional differentiation theory, four different forms of societal differentiation drive human 
development. These are: 
 
1. segmentary differentiation, as in clan divisions among hunter-gatherers 
2. center/periphery differentations, as in ancient imperial systems 
3. stratificatory differentations, as in ascriptive hierarchies of medieval Europe 
4. functional differentations, as in the modern differentiation of spheres of state, economy, 
science etc 
 
As Gorski suggests, Luhmann’s concepts can be used to describe the “internal 
differentiation” of the religious systems of modern societies as well as the (external) differentiation 
of the religious and political systems.  Functional differentiation has been a central feature of 
almost all secularization theorizing; a feature, furthermore, which Casanova has identified as 
representing ‘the still defensible core’ of the theory of secularization’: ‘’the conceptualization of the 
process of societal modernization as a process of functional differentiation and emancipation of the 
secular spheres – primarily the state, the economy, and science – from the religious sphere and the 
concomitant differentiation and specialization of religion within its own newly found religious 
sphere.’29  Taylor echoes this essentially Weberian insight in his description of the results of this 
process in the West: ‘we function within various spheres of activity – economic, political, cultural, 
educational, professional, recreational – the norms and principles we follow, the deliberations we 
engage in, generally don’t refer us to God or to any religious beliefs; the considerations we act on 
are internal to the ‘rationality’ of each sphere – maximum gain within the economy, the greatest 
benefit to the greatest number in the political arena, and so on.’30  This modern pattern is contrasted 
with the situation in earlier times when the Christian faith ‘laid down authoritative prescriptions, 
often through the mouths of the clergy.’31  His reference to the authoritative character of religious 
prescriptions in earlier times suggests an important aspect of differentiation, which should perhaps 
be seen as not so much a matter of horizontal differentiation – the development of autonomous 
spheres each governed by its own ‘rationality’ – but, instead, as a radical shift in the vertical or 
authority relationship between the religious and the secular spheres, in casu the final establishment 
of the state’s precedence over religious officials and/or institutions.   
 
Using Luhmann’s distinctions between the four types of differentiation, the conflicts 
attending the early-modern birth of the confessional state and its eventual, uneven devolution after 
the 1789 French Revolution into something closer to an ideal-typical model of an ostensibly secular 
modern state involved not just functional differentiation – and the radical inversion in the 
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relationship – between the religious and the secular spheres: it also opened the way to conflicts 
along centre-periphery, stratificatory, and even segmentary dimensions of difference.  As 
contrasting patterns of settlement of these conflicts became sedimented in Europe’s different 
corners, the continent’s leading Western powers – the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, British and 
French – also began to export versions of these patterns to their growing imperial possessions.  
  
 The second set of concepts derives from Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of “social fields,” which, 
in contrast to Luhmann’s functionalism, directs attention to the ongoing contestation over the 
dominant “principle of vision and di-vision”, through which the social world is perceived and 
classified. Such contestations are seen to take place within, as well as between, fields – including 
especially those involving the religious and political fields.  Bourdieu suggests three different levels 
of conflict of particular relevance here: 
  
1. within the religious field (inter-religious but also involving conflicts between religious and 
other normative communities, for example secular civic republicans) 
2. within religious communities (intra-religious) 
3. between the religious and non-religious fields (conflicts between religious and non- or anti-
religious actors).32 
 
The conflicts to which the modern state with its means of coercion and consent is a party are 
not limited to conflicts concerning the proper relationship between the religious and non-religious 
fields, the principal focus of classical secularization theory. Of course, contestations around this 
particular conflict line are prevalent in all case studies, but Bourdieu’s approach also directs 
attention to the existence of contestations about the proper place of religion in public life that occur 
between religious communities (inter-religious competition, as between Hindus and Muslims in 
India) and within religious communities (intra-religious struggles, as between Sunnis and Shias in 
Pakistan, or between secular and orthodox Jews in Israel).33 
 
Combining the conceptual tools of Luhmann and Bourdieu, one can then locate all four types of 
Luhmann’s differentiations across Bourdieu’s three different levels of conflict so generating a 
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twelve-cell matrix of types and levels of religious and secular-religious contestations. Conflicts 
around secularization may manifest themselves as  
• First-level, segmentary, centre-periphery, stratificatory, or functional dimensions of difference 
within the religious field, 
• Second-level, segmentary, centre-periphery, stratificatory, or functional dimensions of 
difference within religious communities, 
• and third-level, segmentary, centre-periphery, stratificatory, or functional dimensions of 
difference between the religious and non-religious fields. 
 
Table 1: Patterns of Religious and Secular/Religious Contestation 
Type  
 
 
Level    
     
 
Segmentary 
 
Center/Periphery 
 
Stratificatory 
 
Functional 
 
A: Within 
the religious 
field/between 
religious 
communities 
 
1. 
Indonesia, 
Morocco, 
Pakistan, 
Egypt: 
Religious 
Personal 
Status Law 
 
 
2. 
Japan: State 
Shinto vs 
Buddhism 
 
3. 
India: Hindus 
vs Muslims 
 
4. 
Israel: 
Orthodox Jews 
vs others 
 
B: Within 
religious 
communities  
 
 
5. 
Turkey: 
Sunni vs 
Alevi 
6. 
Morocco: Arabs 
vs Berbers 
7. 
Pakistan: 
Sunnis vs 
Shias 
8. 
Literal versus 
contextual 
readings of 
religious 
injunctions 
  
 
 
 
 
Crosscutting the two typologies yields a matrix generated by types and levels of differentiation and 
contestation, which provides a schematic overview of the variety of the 11 cases covered in the 
volume. The attributions indicated in the table can only be illustrative of important aspects of the 
patterns of contestation identified across the cases; they cannot be exhaustive or comprehensive, 
given the complexities indicated in the case studies themselves – any attempt to make the table so 
would render it unreadable and involve attributing different aspects of individual cases to a large 
number of cells.  China, for example, could be represented in at least seven of the twelve cells; 
instead, here it is presented alongside the USSR as a case of a secularist state committed by its 
policies to confining religion, -- as locally interpreted – to the private realm.  No attempt has been 
made in the volume to capture or study all types equally as if to provide a comprehensive analysis 
preparatory to the sort of ‘global generalisation’ Taylor suggests might one day be possible. But it 
does constitute a beginning.  
 
A. Examples of conflicts within the religious field (inter-religious, but also between 
religious and other normative communities): 
1) Some of the chapters cover cases of segmentary conflict over physical or social space 
between rival religious and/or ideological communities.  India, Israel and all Muslim-majority cases 
included (except for Turkey) feature separate personal status laws for different religious groups that 
the state recognizes as such. Here segmentary differentiation has occurred in personal status so as to 
deal with tensions that otherwise might lead to conflict.  
2) Other cases illustrate the dynamics of center/periphery conflicts over, for example, 
cultural assimilation/autonomy between communities unequally placed relative to centres of power 
and influence. To take the case of Japan, the state elites of the Tokugawa Shogunate supported 
Buddhism on grounds of its social utility even though the Confucian-oriented political leaders of 
the period did not tend to hold Buddhist teachings in high esteem. State elites publicly supported 
Buddhism as a way to regulate the populace but privately were contemptuous of it. Buddhism 
eventually lost its pre-eminent status to State Shinto in the 20th century, which became an important 
element in the Meiji campaign to promote morality through ritual in the formation and discipline of 
imperial subjects.  
3) Other chapters exhibit cases of stratificatory conflict over rank and status between 
communities placed in essentially unequal circumstances as minorities facing large and cohesive 
majorities.  A leading case here concerns the relations between the dominant Hindu majority and 
 
C. Between 
the religious 
and non-
religious 
fields 
 
[Medieval 
Latin 
Christendom] 
 
Turkey: laiklik 
 
Iran: 1979 
revolution 
 
USSR and 
China: Official 
Marxism vs. all 
religion 
 
the large Muslim minority in India, as these have again become a focus of contestation in recent 
decades with the rise of the BJP. In this, India’s Sikh and Christian communities are also implicated 
despite the distinctive pattern of ‘principled equidistance’ of the state from all religious 
communities which the Indian judiciary has attempted to defend. 
 4) Israel presents a case of the coexistence of several main strands of Judaism: Orthodox, 
reform, ultra-orthodox, haredi and, not least, secular Judaism.  As the case study makes clear, the 
tensions between these – and most centrally between secular and Orthodox Jews – at the time of the 
foundation of the state resulted in an effective stalemate over some key issues which led to a trade-
off of functions between a secular leadership in the state and the Orthodox rabbinate in the religious 
field.  This is most clearly observed in the structure of the courts, with personal status issues, 
including marriage, conversion and some property matters being judged in religious instead of in 
state courts.  This functional division of labour has continued to give rise to tensions within the 
Jewish majority of the country’s population which has resonated in the country’s electoral battles 
between parties adopting contrasting stands.  Accordingly, Israeli secularity has been partly held in 
check.  These contestations can be seen to exemplify all three levels of conflict but to the extent that 
they involve issues of who counts as a Jew, they can be interpreted to resonate inter- (as much as 
intra-) religious tensions. 
 
B. Examples of conflicts within religious communities (intra-religious):  
5) A classic case of segmentary conflict between orthodox and heterodox theologies or 
creeds is illustrated in the case of Turkey, where the tensions between the dominant Sunnis and a 
large, dispersed minority of Alevis has continued to agitate both secular and religious thinking, with 
the Alevis typically supporting a secularist ethic which might help protect them from impositions 
arising from the Sunni majority.  As the chapter on Turkey shows, public sphere secularity (laiklik) 
– which was promoted by the Kemalist regime via programmes of what is sometimes called a hard, 
assertive, or aggressive form of secularism – has over the last two decades led to a backlash as the 
ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has pushed illiberal agendas with wide public support. 
6) A center/periphery conflict within religious communities is exemplified by the case of 
Morocco, where the Arab centre with its symbolic head, the King as the ‘Commander of the 
Faithful,’ is counter-posed to the Berbers located in the country’s periphery.  Although, as the case 
study points out, there have in the past been attempts to Christianize the Berbers, the conflict 
remains a largely intra-religious one among Muslims which reverberates differential positions along 
a centre-periphery dimension with all its implications for status and material advantages favouring 
denizens of the Arab centres, particularly the urban areas located there. 
7) An important case of intra-religious conflict along stratificatory lines can be identified in 
Pakistan where minority Shias suffer particularly high levels of disadvantage.  (In this they share a 
common fate with the much smaller minorities of Pakistan’s Christians, Jews, Hindus and Sikhs 
which articulate inter-religious conflicts.) The case study argues that ‘Sunnization’ policies after 
Zia-ul-Haq should be seen not so much as the abandonment of secularism as instead the implanting 
of an ethno-religious form of secularity which can be identified in contrast to Taylor’s three 
Secularities as a Secularity IV. 
8) Examples of conflicts across lines of functional differentiation between narrower and 
broader construals of religious traditions, and ideas about the proper role of the state in upholding 
these can be found in all the Muslim-majority cases covered in the volume.  The types of conflict 
have revolved around such questions as whether the state should stipulate the beginning and end of 
Ramadan, regulate the availability of divorce, or license the activity of religious police in upholding 
locally required standards of dress and behavior.  The labeling of the competing views on issues of 
this sort as literal versus contextual, or narrower versus broader varies relative to who is doing the 
labeling but the existence of such a dimension of differentiation would appear to be universal and in 
many cases very prominent in a way which is rarely to be found in the main majoritarian religious 
traditions of contemporary Europe. 
 
C. Examples of Conflicts between the religious and non-religious fields:   
9) The absence from the table of a leading case in our chapters of segmentary conflict 
regarding the relationship between the religious and non-religious fields is symptomatic of the fact 
that this type of conflict requires a significant level of rivalry between holders of authority in the 
religious and non-religious fields respectively and as such can only apply to a situation before the 
emergence of the modern state. In medieval Christendom the differentiation between separate 
secular and religious jurisdictions comes to mind, which also distinguished between significant 
sections of the population, with the church’s jurisdiction reaching beyond ordained officials to 
include those who lived and worked on the large ecclesiastical estates.  From Augustine’s “two 
cities” through Marsilius’ “two swords” and even surviving vestigially in Luther’s “two kingdoms”, 
the distinction was a common basis for division.  It might even be argued that the segmentary 
principle still has champions today, both amongst political liberals, advocating a strict “separation 
of church and state”, but also amongst some religious sectarians, who jealously defend the 
autonomy of their communities. Associating these positions with the segmentary principle is 
misconceived, however, even though the rhetoric may suggest otherwise, as the stratificatory 
conflicts between the religious and political fields have been won by the latter. It is the state that 
determines the relationship between religion and politics in the contemporary world, even in 
countries governed by religious authorities, like contemporary Iran. 
10) Aspects of a center/periphery conflict between state-centred secularism and a majority 
religious tradition strongly entrenched in the periphery were present in Turkey with its distinctive 
tradition of Kemalist laiklik borrowed from the French model.  The central node is only in part 
geographically specific (Ankara, which was preferred by Atatürk to multi-religious and 
metropolitan Istanbul); it can be defined more particularly, following Shils, as involving a 
concentration of state power which was until recently largely insulated from the large mass of the 
rural and small-town population with their strong religious traditions. 
11) Stratificatory conflicts involving the subordination by secular elites of cultural-religious 
groups and traditions have been exemplified in all of the cases reviewed. One of the most striking 
differences between the approaches adopted in our case studies and Taylor’s account is that the 
encounter with the west typically helped political administrations to win the stratificatory contest 
with religion within a relatively short time frame. Whether colonized or not, “religion” and “state” 
in our case studies were never involved as equal competitors in a struggle over influence. Rather, 
religion, like any other social element, was subordinated to the interests of political power, first 
colonial or imperial power, later that of the emerging nation-state. It was the state in whose hands it 
lay to regulate religion, and it often over time developed ways to regulate traditional strongholds of 
religious autonomy, such as (religious) law, and (religious) education. It is here that the issue of 
differential burdening becomes most apparent, as remnants of religious law remain bones of 
contention between state and social elites in all Muslim-majority cases and in Israel. Nikkie Keddie 
has observed that “Islamic history is different from Western Christian history, partly because 
modernizing trends began earlier and have been more gradual in the West, and also because Islam 
has not had a strong secular legal tradition. These are two of the factors that have made 
secularization more difficult and contentious in recent decades in the Islamic world than in the 
West, while all the main scriptural monotheistic religions have been more resistant to secularization 
than have other religious traditions.”34 We noted earlier that contestations around Secularity I are 
particularly apparent in the Muslim world and Israel, as both Islam and Judaism may be interpreted 
as placing more demands on public law than is the case in Christianity, Buddhism or Hinduism. 
Like Keddie, we find that the non- and polytheist societies have embraced secularization with less 
resistance than those of Eastern Christianity, Judaism and Islam. 
12) The most striking cases of functional conflict arising around the differentiation of the 
religious and non-religious fields are found in the Russian, Turkish and Chinese cases.  The radical 
marginalization for long periods of time of indigenous religious traditions, institutions, and 
practices relied on a sharp differentiation between the collection of all public authority in state or 
party organisations and the subjugation and, at times, virtual elimination of independent religious 
authority.  The revolutionary secularist project only partly involved an inversion of previous 
patterns of state-religious relations, since in all three cases religious institutions had long been 
subjected to state authorities; the differentiation and subsequent control of the religious field by the 
political was however new and involved the stripping out of the sacral claims of the previously 
established state authorities.  
In Russia, the attempt after the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 to remove all 
references to religion from the public sphere involved a radical reversal of the predominant pattern 
of the Tsarist ancién regime.  Propaganda and pressure on leading church officials became 
important tools in the campaign against the Church and religion generally. This intensified during 
the ‘Great Terror’; Froese quotes one former Soviet official who maintained that 85,300 priests, 
monks and other religious were executed in 1937, 21,000 in 1938 and 3,900 between 1939 and 
1941. With the installation of the New Learning system in China, Confucianism had lost its 
monopolistic position in the education sector, maintaining little place in the secularized national 
teaching program. Confucian classics were henceforth treated as objects of philosophical and 
historical studies, rather than carriers of holy knowledge about moral norms and political 
legitimacy. In Turkey’s 1924 revolution, religious educational institutions were closed, and 
religious law and jurisprudence replaced by secular codes of law. The wearing of religious garb was 
prohibited and religious organizations, including Sufi orders, closed down.  
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 Concluding Observations 
The case studies illustrate a wide variety of patterns of resistances to, or accommodations of, 
secularity of the Western variety that demonstrate the emergence beyond the West of multiple 
secularities in a globalized context supportive of multiple modernities. It has been the purpose of 
this article to indicate the range of these patterns and to suggest how they might be accounted for, 
namely by reference to the history of underlying tensions, conflicts, and contestations arising out of 
contrasting sets of oppositions within and between groups defined by religion, including of course 
those that hew to a secularist position of denying any special consideration of religious claims. 
Secularization in the sense of differentiation between the political and religious spheres has 
occurred in all eleven cases, though it has not led in all cases to the evacuation of religion from 
public life and related areas (Taylor’s Secularity I).  In fact, religion retains a presence in the 
personal law of all included cases but Turkey, Russia, China and Japan. In some, it is also present in 
the notion of political authority, such as in Iran, and to a lesser extent, in Morocco. What about 
Secularity III, the notion of secularity of particular interest to Taylor? Has the option not to believe 
become widely acceptable in the included case studies? The crude answer is no. In none of the 
Muslim majority countries is it entirely without legal and social consequence to declare oneself a 
non-believer. In India, Israel, Japan, Russia and Turkey, Secularity III does exist for segments of the 
population, though the choice to not believe is not a value appreciated by society at large.  
In all our cases, the conditions of belief have been highly influenced by contestations around 
Secularity I. Following Gorski in our volume, we have schematized these contestations drawing on 
tools provided by Luhmann and Bourdieu. This schematization does not permit of confident 
conclusions about which types of contestation result in more or less stable patterns of resolution, or 
result in more or less satisfactory outcomes in terms of human rights, freedoms and human 
flourishing.     Nonetheless, some partial conclusions can be identified. It is for example a striking 
observation that in Turkey the salience of the ongoing struggles around both Secularity I and III has 
nearly exclusively been located on the boundary between the religious and non-religious fields, 
deriving from the fact that since 1924 religious authority has been almost entirely state-defined and 
regulated. On the other hand, recent events in Turkey (as of early 2015) raise considerable doubts 
about the stability of the current - or other emergent -settlements with all their implications for the 
likelihood of a satisfactory resolution of the dilemmas associated with the guarantee of freedom 
both for and from religion. The most stable cases among the eleven in terms of religion-state 
relations are those of Japan and Indonesia. It may be no accident that both states ‘invented’ a pan-
religious ethos, Shinto and pancasila respectively, that serves the simultaneous purpose of 
promoting nation-building, while allowing all recognized religions a protected space within which 
to flourish. As such, both ethoi promote social cohesion and provide positive freedom of religion. 
On the other hand, the freedom to not believe (freedom from religion), with its associated 
characteristics of doubt, search and nihilism, is presumably too precarious for the state to openly 
accommodate or cater for. 
 
 
